L'Anarquisme al llarg de la seva història ha exercit una gran influència a Espanya, on, durant la major part de la seva existència, ha anat lligat al sindicalisme. Les tesis col·lectivistes de l'AIT portaran a una part del moviment obrer espanyol a organitzar-se seguint una línia anarco-sindicalista, la qual considera el sindicat com la via amb la qual s'ha d'articular el moviment obrer.

L'Anarquisme va arrelar a Espanya, i sobretot a Catalunya, amb l'entrada de la Primera Internacional (AIT - Associació Internacional de Treballadors) i la introducció, amb ella, de les idees del principal teòric anarquista del moment, Bakunin - el qual va aconseguir una àmplia difusió a partir de la revolució de SETEMBRE de 1868, quan bona part de l'obrerisme s'afilià a l'AIT -. Tot i això, els antecedents de l'anarquisme a Espanya es troben en la influència de les idees proudhonianes que arribaren directament de França o amb l'obra de Pi i Margall, i la seva configuració cal situar-la en l'anomenat Sexenni Revolucionari de 1868-1873.

Abans de 1868, hi havia una gran repressió del moviment obrer a Espanya, els sindicats estaven prohibits, els seus afiliats eren enviats a Guinea i als seus caps se'ls llençava per la borda durant el viatge. L'associacionisme obrer estava totalment prohibit per la Constitució i les lleis i el càstig era la deportació. A més a més, s'havien produït pocs contactes entre el moviment internacional i el moviment obrer espanyol. Però, aquesta situació canvia a partir de 1868, quan es produeix una obertura del règim gràcies al triomf de la revolució "la Gloriosa" de setembre d'aquest any - revolució produïda per una crisi econòmica general del sistema i ve motivada per una sèrie de males collites que s'agreugen al 1868 -.

Aquesta obertura del règim produeix un augment dels contactes dins del moviment obrer que cada vegada són més constants gràcies a l'establiment, per primer cop, de les llibertats d'expressió i associació obrera. Això permet un fort expandiment i una gran fortalesa de l'associacionisme obrer, expansionisme que té el seu punt més fort a Catalunya, on el procés industrialitzador estava més avançat i contava amb la classe obrera més nombrosa i amb més tradició obrera de tot l'Estat.

L'expandiment de les societats obreres a Espanya atraurà l'interès de l'AIT, que envia un representant, Giuseppe Fanelli, que manté contactes a Madrid, Barcelona i València amb aquestes societats. A partir d'aquests contactes comencen a aparèixer la creació de seccions de l'AIT a diversos llocs, i al 1870 es dóna la convocatòria del Primer Congrés Obrer a l'Estat espanyol, que tingué lloc a Barcelona el 18 de juny de 1870.

Aquest congrés de Barcelona és molt important per tres motius:

És la primera vegada que s'intenta organitzar a totes les societats obreres diferenciades de la resta de col·lectius a Espanya.

Assoleix una gran representativitat.

Inaugura i formalitza la creació d'un organisme general de les societats obreres a tot Espanya, la FRE de l'AIT.

L'evolució de la FRE de l'AIT (Federació Regional Espanyola de l'AIT) ve marcada per dos fets bàsics:

Els Fets de la Comuna de París a França del març-maig de 1871 i les seves repercussions a Espanya: el 2 de maig de 1871 es produeix un aixecament a Madrid, el qual produeix una gran onada de repressió del moviment obrer. Tota aquesta situació provoca:

l'exili de la direcció de la FRE de l'AIT a Lisboa, que l'AIT es converteixi en una organització il·legal a Espanya, que, als seus inicis, la FRE de l'AIT es vegi obligada a actuar en la clandestinitat i això dóna més força a actituds més radicals de grups clandestins que estan disposats a tot, els quals són minoritaris però poden mantenir relacions clares amb actuacions directes.

Discussions internes a l'AIT i les seves repercussions a Espanya: l'enfrontament entre Marx i Bakunin o entre autoritaris i anti-autoritaris dins de l'AIT, que porta a l'escissió de l'AIT, produeix una crisi interna dins de la FRE de l'AIT, que té el seu epicentre a Madrid, i portarà a la divisió en dos nuclis a la federació local de Barcelona (anti-autoritaris) i la de Madrid (autoritaris), que s'enfronten. Guanyen els anti-autoritaris i la federació local de Madrid s'escindirà, que donarà lloc, posteriorment, al PSOE. Els anti-autoritaris també expulsen als sectors cooperativistes i societaris moderats, radicalitzant l'AIT espanyola i posant les bases del futur moviment anarco-sindicalista espanyol que amb el temps donarà lloc a la .

El 1881 es dissol la FRE de l'AIT que dura més temps que a altres països d'Europa. La seva dissolució es produeix com a conseqüència d'una nova etapa de llibertats públiques amb l'accés de Sagasta al poder i porta al naixement de la FTRE (Federació de Treballadors de la Regió Espanyola) formada de la resta de la direcció de l'AIT i amb control anarquista.

La FTRE fa una espècie de Congrés a Sevilla en 1881 que presenta una novetat important respecte a altres moviments anarquistes de la resta d'Europa i és el fet de l'augment de pes dels sectors anarquistes camperols, sobretot procedents d'Andalusia. A tot Espanya, s'inicia una campanya contra el congrés, deguda a la divisió que apareix dins l'anarquisme entre els sectors que defensen l'anarco-col·lectivisme i els sectors que defensen l'anarco-comunisme. Aquest ambient hostil i l'aparició d'una organització secreta, la Mano Negra, entre 1884 i 1885, el moviment anarquista quedarà aïllat del conjunt de la societat. Aquest clima d'intolerància vers l'anarquisme i la gran repressió que pateix entre 1885 i 1890, va provocar l'autodissolució de la FTRE.

Al 1890 es produeix una reorganització de l'anarquisme a partir de diferents àmbits locals i dispersos i també per la superació de discussions entre anarco-col·lectivistes i anarco-comunistes, perquè aquests darrers van guanyant posicions a través de la propaganda de R. Mella, i l'arribada a Espanya d'Erico Malatesta al 1891 que donen a l'anarquisme una estructura ideològica elaborada que porta a una tercera corrent anarquista que sorgeix de l'anarco-comunisme, que serà important, i la que aguanta l'anarquisme fins a l'actualitat.

Aquesta tercera via sorgirà a partir de l'educació dels treballadors en Ateneus populars, el seu accés a la cultura, a la crítica social i que combinaran la lluita ideològica i cultural. Aquesta via superarà als anarco-col·lectivistes, s'oposarà a la lluita social i crearà una nova organització d'àmbit estatal. Serà un anarquisme pragmàtic, no dogmàtic, no confessional i conservaven les tradicions de l'anarquisme. Està influenciat per corrents filosòfiques noves i no oficials en aquell moment (Teosofistes, naturistes, positivistes, espiritistes, vegetarianista,...). Aquesta corrent dóna a l'anarquisme una gran projecció de corrent cultural desenvolupant tot una crítica de la societat, dogmes polítics, religiosos, del poder, de l'Estat,... I tot això és el que possibilita atreure a sectors de la classe mitja i reforçar els vincles amb el republicanisme on compartirà espais ideològics comuns.

A partir de la Vaga General de 1890 commemorant l'1 de maig es produeix un rellançament i una renovació dins del moviment obrer espanyol, sobretot a Catalunya, que portarà al triomf, dins de l'anarquisme, de les idees anarco-sindicalistes i del sindicalisme revolucionari sobre el tema de la Vaga General -ha de ser general o sectorial-, i a una renovació generacional dels dirigents anarquistes.

Tota aquesta situació de renovació generacional i ideològica porta, al juny de 1907, a la formació d'una comissió organitzadora del que seria, el mes d'agost, el Pacte de la Solidaritat Obrera. Els uneix que tots són obrers. Per sobre de tot hi ha solidaritat de classe, i això és el que significa SO (Solidaritat Obrera) i posteriorment la .

SO aplegarà treballadors republicans, anarquistes, procedents de la Federació Catalana del PSOE i independents d'ideologia radical i republicana i funcionarà internament a base de coordinadores que representen societats obreres. Es coordinen tota una sèrie d'organitzacions obreres per rams. Serà un moviment unitari que va de 1907 a 1910 aplegant a totes les faccions de l'obrerisme català.

Al 1909 amb l'esclat de la Setmana Tràgica a Barcelona, es trenca SO i es clarifica el moviment sindical. Els sectors republicans radicals, seguidors d'Alejandro Lerroux, i els sectors socialistes són expulsats de SO, la qual queda reduïda a anarquistes i sindicalistes. Aquests dos grups, durant el 1910, es dedicaran a reorganitzar el moviment obrer i el 1911, a Sants, fundaran la .

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No Middle Ground Anti-Authoritarian Perspectives on Latin America & the Caribbean No. 2 Fall, 1983

Editors' Note: The following article was originally published by the Situationist group Pointblank! in October 1973.

In the spectacular arena of current events recognized as "news," the funeral of social democracy in Chile has been orchestrated as high drama by those who understand the rise & fall of governments most intuitively: other specialists of power. The last scenes in the Chilean script have been written in various political camps in accordance with the requirements of particular ideologies. Some have come to bury Allende, some to praise him. Still others claim an ex post facto knowledge of his errors. Whatever the sentiments expressed, these obituaries have been written long in advance. The organizers of "public opinion" can only react reflexively & with a characteristic distortion of the events themselves.

As the respective blocs of world opinion "choose sides," the Chilean tragedy is reproduced as farce on an international scale; the class struggles in Chile are dissimulated as a pseudo-conflict between rival ideologies. In the discussions of ideology nothing will be heard from those for whom the "socialism" of the Allende regime was supposedly intended: the Chilean workers & peasants. Their silence has been ensured not only by those who machine-gunned them in their factories, fields, & houses, but by those who claimed (and continue to claim) to represent their "interests." In spite of a thousand misrepresentations, however, the forces that were involved in the "Chilean experiment" have not yet played themselves out. Their real content will be established only when the forms of their interpretation have been demystified.

Above all else, Chile has fascinated the so-called Left in every country. & in documenting the atrocities of the current junta, each party & sect attempts to conceal the stupidities of its previous analyses. From the bureaucrats-in-power in Moscow, Peking, & Havana to the bureaucrats-in-exile of the Trotskyist movements, a liturgical chorus of leftist pretenders offer their post-mortem assessments of Chile, with conclusions as predictable as their rhetoric. The differences between them are only ones of hierarchical nuance; they share a Leninist terminology which expresses 50 years of counterrevolution throughout the world.

The Stalinist parties of the West & the "socialist" states quite rightly view the defeat of Allende as their defeat: he was one of their own--a man of State. With the false logic which is an essential mechanism of their power, those who know so much about State & (the defeat of) Revolution decry the overthrow of a constitutional, bourgeois regime. For their part, the "left" importers of Trotskyism & Maoism can only lament the absence of a "vanguard party--the deus ex machina of senile Bolshevism--in Chile. Those who have inherited the defeat of revolutionary Kronstadt & Shanghai know whereof they speak: the Leninist project requires the absolute imposition of a deformed "class consciousness" (the consciousness of a bureaucratic ruling class) upon those who in their designs are only "the masses." The dimensions of the "Chilean Revolution" lie outside the constraints of any particular doctrine. While the "anti-imperialists" of the world denounce--from a safe distance--the all-too-convenient bogeyman of the CIA, the real reasons for the defeat of the Chilean proletariat must be sought elsewhere. Allende the martyr was the same Allende who disarmed the workers' militias of Santiago & Valparaiso in the weeks before the coup & left them defenseless before the military whose officers were already in his cabinet. These actions cannot simply be explained as "class-collaboration" or as a "sellout." The conditions for the strange defeat of the Unidad Popular were prepared long in advance. The social contradictions that emerged in the streets & fields of Chile during August & September were not simply divisions between "Left" & "Right" but involved a contradiction between the Chilean proletariat & the politicians of all parties, including those that posed as the most "revolutionary." In an "underdeveloped" country, a highly developed class struggle had arisen which threatened the positions of all those who wished to maintain underdevelopment, whether economically through continued imperialist domination, or politically through the retardation of an authentic proletarian power in Chile. II Everywhere, the expansion of capital creates its apparent opposite in the form of nationalist movements which seek to appropriate the means of production "on behalf" of the exploited & thereby appropriate social & political power for themselves. Imperialism's extraction of surplus has its political & social consequences, not only in enforced poverty of those who must become its workers, but in the secondary role allotted to the local bourgeoisie, which is incapable of establishing its complete hegemony over society. It is precisely this vacuum which the "national liberation" movements seek to occupy, thereby assuming the managerial role unfulfilled by the dependent bourgeoisie. This process has taken many forms--from the religious xenophobia of Khadafi to the bureaucratic religion of Mao--but in each instance, the marching orders of "anti-imperialism" are the same, & those who give them are in identical positions of command. The imperialist distortion of the Chilean economy provided an opening for a popular movement which aimed at establishing a national capital base. However, Chile's relatively advanced economic status precluded the kind of bureaucratic development which has come to power by force of arms in other areas of the "Third World" (a term which has been used to conceal the real class divisions in those countries). The fact that the "progressive" Unidad Popular was able to achieve an electoral victory as a reformist coalition was a reflection of the peculiar social structure in Chile, which was in many respects similar to those in advanced capitalist countries. At the same time, capitalist industrialization created the conditions for the possible supersession of this bureaucratic alternative in the form of a rural & urban proletariat which emerged as the most important class & one with revolutionary aspirations. In Chile, both Christian & Social Democrats were to prove to be the opponents of any radical solution to existing problems. Until the advent of the UP coalition, the contradictions on the Chilean Left between a radical base of workers & peasants & its so-called political "representatives" remained to a large extent latent antagonisms. The leftist parties were able to organize a popular movement solely on the basis of the foreign threat posed by American capital. The Communists & Socialists were able to sustain their image as authentic nationalists under Christian Democratic rule because Frei's "Chileanization" program (which included a policy of agrarian reform that Allende was later to consciously emulate) was explicitly connected to the American-sponsored "Alliance for Progress." The official Left was able to construct its own alliance within Chile in opposing, not reformism itself, but a reformism with external ties. Even given its moderate nature, the opposition program of the Chilean Left was only adopted after the militant strike activity of the 1960s--organized independently of the parties--threatened the existence of the Frei regime. The succeeding UP was to move into a space opened up by the radical actions of the Chilean workers & peasants; it imposed itself as an institutionalized representation of proletarian causes to the extent that it was able to recuperate them. In spite of the extremely radical nature of many of the earlier strike actions (which included factory occupations & the workers' administration of several industrial plants, most notably at COOTRALACO), the practice of the Chilean proletariat lacked a corresponding theoretical or organizational expression, & this failure to affirm its autonomy left it open to the manipulations of the politicians. Despite this, the battle between reform & revolution was far from having been decided. III The election of the freemason Allende, although it in no way meant that the workers & peasants had established their own power, nonetheless intensified the class struggle occurring throughout Chile. Contrary to the UP's assertions that the working class had won a major "victory," both the proletariat & its enemies were to continue their battle outside conventional parliamentary channels. Although Allende constantly assured the workers that they were both engaged in a "common struggle," he revealed the true nature of his socialism-by-decree at the beginning of his tenure when he signed the Estatuto, which formally guaranteed that he would faithfully respect the bourgeois constitution. Having come to power on the basis of a "radical" program, the UP was to come into conflict with a growing revolutionary current at its base. When the Chilean proletariat showed that it was prepared to take the slogans of the UP program literally--slogans that amounted only to empty rhetoric & unfulfilled promises on the part of the bureaucratic coalition--and put them into practice, the contradictions between the content & form of the Chilean revolution became apparent. The workers & peasants of Chile were beginning to speak & act for themselves. For all his "Marxism," Allende was never more than an administrator of state intervention in a capitalist economy. Allende's etatisme--a form of state capitalism that has accompanied the rise of all administrators of underdevelopment--was itself not more than a quantitative extension of Christian Democratic policies. In nationalizing the copper mines & other industrial sectors, Allende continued the centralization initiated under the control of the Chilean state apparatus--a centralization initiated by the Left's "archenemy" Frei. Allende, in fact, was forced into nationalizing certain concerns because they had been spontaneously occupied by their workers. In forestalling the workers' self-management of industry by defusing these occupations, Allende actively opposed the establishment of socialist relations of production. As a result of his actions, the Chilean workers only exchanged one set of bosses for another: the government bureaucracy, instead of Kennecott or Anaconda, directed their alienated labor. This change in appearances could not conceal the fact that Chilean capitalism was perpetuating itself. From the profits extracted by multinational corporations to the "five-year plans" of international Stalinism, the accumulation of capital is an accumulation always made at the expense of the proletariat. That governments & social revolutions have nothing in common was demonstrated in rural areas as well. In contrast to the bureaucratic administration of "agrarian reform" which was inherited & continued by the Allende regime, the spontaneous armed seizures of large estates offered a revolutionary answer to the "land question." For all the efforts of the CORA (the central agrarian reform agency) to prevent these expropriations through the mediation of "peasant cooperatives" (asentamientos), the peasants' direct action went beyond such illusory forms of "participation." Many of the fundo takeovers were legitimized by the government only after pressure from the campesinos made it impossible to do otherwise. Recognizing that such actions called into question its own authority as well as that of the landowners, the UP never missed an opportunity to denounce "indiscriminate" expropriations & to call for a "slow-down." The autonomous actions of the rural & urban proletariat formed the basis for the development of a movement significantly to the left of the Allende government. At the same time, this movement provided yet another occasion for a political representation to impose itself on the realities of the Chilean class struggle. This role was assumed by the Guevarist militants of the MIR [Left Revolutionary Movement] & its rural counterpart, the MCR, both of which succeeded in recuperating many of the radical achievements of the workers & peasants. The Miristas slogan of "armed struggle" & their obligatory refusal of electoral politics were merely pro forma gestures: shortly after the 1970 election, an elite corps of the ex-urban guerrillas of MIR became Allende's personally selected palace guard. The ties that bound the MIR-MCR to the UP went beyond purely tactical considerations--both had common interests to defend. Despite MIR's revolutionary posturing, it acted according to the UP's bureaucratic exigencies: whenever the government was in trouble, the adjutants of MIR would rally its militants around the UP banner. If the MIR failed to be the "vanguard" of the Chilean proletariat, it was not because it wasn't enough of a vanguard, but because its strategy was resisted by those whom it tried to manipulate. IV Right-wing activity in Chile increased, not in response to any governmental decrees, but because of the direct threat posed by the independence of the proletariat. In the face of mounting economic difficulties, the UP could only talk of "rightist sabotage" & the obstinacy of a "workers' aristocracy." For all the impotent denunciations of the government, these "difficulties" were social problems that could only be solved in a radical way through the establishment of a revolutionary power in Chile. In spite of its claim to "defend the rights of the workers," the Allende government proved to be an impotent bystander in the class struggle unfolding outside of formal political structures. It was the workers & peasants themselves who took the initiative against the reaction & in so doing created new & radical forms of social organization, forms which expressed a highly-developed class consciousness. After the bosses' strike in October 1972, the workers did not wait for the UP to intervene, but actively occupied the factories & started up production on their own, without state or trade union "assistance." Cordones industriales, which controlled & coordinated the distribution of products & organized armed defense against the employers, were formed in the factory complexes. Unlike the "popular assemblies" promised by the UP, which only existed on paper, the cordones were set up by the workers themselves. In their structure & functioning, these committees--along with the rural consejos--were the first manifestations of a councilist tendency & as such constituted the most important contribution to the development of a revolutionary situation in Chile. A similar situation existed in the neighborhoods, where the inefficient, government-controlled "supply boards" (JAPs) were bypassed in the proclamations of "self-governing neighborhoods" & the organization of commandos comunales by the residents. Despite their infiltration by the fidelistas of MIR, these armed expropriations of social space formed the point of departure for an authentic proletarian power. For the first time, people who had previously been excluded from participation in social life were able to make decisions concerning the most basic realities of their daily lives. The men, women, & youth of the poblaciones discovered that revolution was not a matter for the ballot box; whatever the quarters were called--New Havana, Heroic Vietnam--what went on inside them had nothing to do with the alienated landscapes of their namesakes. Although the achievements that were realized by popular initiative were considerable, a third force capable of posing a revolutionary alternative to the government & the reactionaries never fully emerged. The workers & peasants failed to extend their conquests to the point of replacing the Allende regime with their own power. Their supposed "ally," the MIR, used its talk of opposing burocratismo with the "armed masses" as a mask for its own intrigues. In its Leninist scheme, the cordones were seen as "forms of struggle" that would prepare the way for future, less "restricted" organizational models, whose leadership would be supplied by the MIR, no doubt. For all its concern over the right-wing plots that menaced its existence, the government restrained the workers from taking positive action to resolve the class struggle in Chile. In so doing, the initiative passed from the workers' hands into the government's, & in allowing itself to be out-maneuvered, the Chilean proletariat paved the way for its future defeat. In response to Allende's pleas after the abortive coup of June 29, the workers occupied additional factories, only to close ranks behind the forces that would disarm them a month later. These occupations remained defined by the UP & its intermediaries in the national trade union, the CUT, who kept the workers isolated from each other by barricading them inside the factories. In such a situation, the proletariat was powerless to carry on any independent struggle, & once the Weapons Act had been signed, its fate was sealed. Like the Spanish Republicans who denied arms to the anarchist militias on the Aragon front, Allende was not prepared to tolerate the existence of an armed proletarian force outside his own regime. All the conspiracies of the Right would not have lasted a day if the Chilean workers & peasants had been armed & had organized their own militias. Although the MIR protested against the entry of the military into the government, they, like their predecessors in Uruguay, the Tupamaros, only talked of arming the workers & had little to do with the resistance that took place. The workers' slogan, "A disarmed people is a defeated people" was to find its bitter truth in the slaughter of workers & peasants that followed the military coup. Allende was overthrown, not because of his reforms, but because he was unable to control the revolutionary movement which spontaneously developed at the base of the UP. The junta which installed itself in his position clearly perceived the threat of revolution & set about eliminating it with all the means at its disposal. It was no accident that the strongest resistance to the dictatorship occurred in those areas where the power of the workers had advanced the furthest. In the Sumar Textile Plant & in Concepcion, for instance, the junta was forced to liquidate this power by means of air strikes. As a result of Allende's policies, the military was able to have a free hand in finishing what it had begun under the UP government: Allende was as responsible as Pinochet for the mass murders of workers & peasants in Santiago, Valparaiso, Antofogasta & the provinces. Perhaps the most revealing of all the ironies inherent in the UP's downfall is that while many of Allende's supporters did not survive the coup, many of his reforms did. So little meaning was left to political categories that the junta's new Foreign Minister could describe himself as a "socialist." V Radical movements are underdeveloped to the extent that they respect alienation & surrender their power to external forces instead of creating it for themselves. In Chile, the revolutionaries hastened the day of their own Thermidor by letting "representatives" speak & act on their behalf: although parliamentary authority had been effectively replaced by the cordones, the workers did not go beyond these conditions of dual power & abolish the bourgeois State & the parties that maintained it. If the future struggles in Chile are to advance, the enemies within the workers' movement must be overcome practically; the councilist tendencies in the factories, neighborhoods, & fields will be everything or nothing. All the vanguard parties that will continue to pass themselves off as the "workers' leadership"--whether they be the MIR, a clandestine CP, or any other underground splinter groups--can only repeat the betrayals of the past. Ideological imperialism must be confronted as radically as economic imperialism has been expropriated; the workers & peasants can depend only on themselves to advance beyond what the cordones industriales have already accomplished.

Comparisons between the Chilean experience & the 1936 Spanish Revolution are already being made, & not only here--one finds strange words coming from Trotskyists in praise of workers' militias which fought against all forms of hierarchy. While it is true that a radical third force did emerge in Chile, it did so only tentatively. Unlike the Spanish proletariat, the Chilean revolutionaries never created an entirely new kind of society on the basis of councilist organization, & the Chilean Revolution will only succeed if these forms (cordones, comandos) are capable of establishing their social hegemony. The obstacles to their development are similar to those that were confronted in Spain: the Spanish councils & militias faced two enemies in the form of Fascism & the Republican government, while the Chilean workers face international capitalism & the manipulators of social-democracy & Leninism.

From the favellas of Brazil to the labor camps of Cuba, the proletariat of the Caribbean, the proletariat of Latin America has maintained a continual offensive against all those who seek to maintain present conditions.

In its struggle, the proletariat is faced with various caricatures of revolution which masquerade as its allies. These travesties have in turn encountered a false movement of so-called "ultra-left" opposition. Thus, the ex-fascist Peron prepares to construct a corporate state in Argentina, this time in a leftist guise, while the Trotskyist commandos of the ERP denounce him for not being "revolutionary" enough, & the ex-guerrillero Castro berates all those who fail to meet the standards of "communist" discipline. History will not fail to dissolve the power of these idiots.

A conspiracy of tradition--with agents on both the Left & the Right--ensures that existing reality is always presented in terms of false alternatives. The only choices acceptable to Power are those between competing hierarchies: the colonels of Peru or the generals of Brazil, the armies of the Arab states or those of Israel. These antagonisms only express divisions within global capitalism, & any genuinely revolutionary alternative will have to be established since it is nowhere in power in Latin America or anywhere else, & this powerlessness constantly impels it to new actions. The Chilean workers are not alone in their opposition to the forces of counter-revolution; the revolutionary movement that began in Mexico with Villa's guerrilla bands has not yet come to an end. In the armed workers' militias that fought in the streets of Santo Domingo in 1965, the urban insurrection in Cordoba, Argentina in 1969, & the recent strikes & occupations in Bolivia & Uruguay, the spontaneous revolt of workers & students in Trinidad in 1970, & the continuing revolutionary crisis is itself over the ruins of these spectacular conflicts. The combined lies of bourgeois & bureaucratic power must be confronted by a revolutionary truth in arms, all over the world as in Chile. There can be no "socialism in one country," or in one factory or district. Revolution is an international task which can only be solved on an international level--it does not recognize continental frontiers. Like any revolution, the Chilean Revolution requires the success of similar movements in other areas. Everywhere, in the wildcat strikes in the United States & West Germany, the factory occupations in France, & in civil insurrections in the USSR, the foundations for a new world are being laid. Those who recognize themselves in this global movement must seize the opportunity to extend it with all the subversive weapons at their disposal.
http://recollectionbooks.com/anow/world/la/argentina/

-- MOVING DATES Quines són les principals accions de la CNT-FAI en el període 1923-1936/39? Les principals accions dels anarco-sindicalistes en el període 1923-1936/39 són:

La vaga de la Telefònica (6 juliol -29 juliol de 1931): vaga dels operaris de la Companyia Telefònica (en mans de l'American Telephone & Telegraph Co. - ATT- des de la Dictadura) a nivell de tot l'Estat. Aquests eren membres del sindicat de telèfons de la , única organització del ram.

La vaga del port de Barcelona (7 juliol 1931): els membres del sindicat cenetista del ram del transport paralitzaren els molls de Barcelona. L'aturada no fou total, però el port va quedar pràcticament tancat.

La sublevació a l'Alt Llobregat (18 gener 1932): els obrers anarco-sindicalistes de la zona minera de l'Alt Llobregat i del Cardoner, es llançaren a una aventura revolucionària que va donar lloc a cinc dies de Comunisme Llibertari. Però al final va fracassar.

El Comitè Central de Milícies Antifascistes de Catalunya (juliol 1936): constituït immediatament després de l'aixecament militar del 19 de juliol de 1936. Formada per: 3 representants de la , 2 de la FAI, 4 d'ERC i Unió Republicana, 3 d'UGT i representants dels partits integrants del PSUC. Estava dominat pels anarco-sindicalistes i fou el substitut de les institucions republicanes que encara estaven en funcionament. Es dissolgué el 27 SETEMBRE 1936.

Els fets de maig de 1937 a Barcelona: enfrontaments a Barcelona entre els treballadors de la i del POUM contra la Policia del Front Popular.

Com i per què es va produir l'escissió de la CNT dels trentistes i l'aparició dels Sindicats d'Oposició?

Els últims dies d'abril de 1932 es va produir a Sabadell un important ple regional català que es va caracteritzar per fortes discussions entre les tendències moderada (trentistes) i anarquista (FAI). Els moderats tractaren de recuperar el control de Solidaridad Obrera, però van fracassar. El ple s'obrí amb les expulsions de les federacions locals de Lleida i Girona. En aquest congrés s'elegí com a secretari regional a Alejandro Gilabert (faista). Aquesta maniobra no va agradar a les delegacions sindicals. Els sindicats de Sabadell sortiren del congrés. Poc després sortiren els sindicats de Badalona, per ésser designada Barcelona per la seu del nou comitè regional.

En la segona meitat de 1932 es van produir una sèrie d'expulsions decretades contra els moderats. El 24 de SETEMBRE el comitè regional català va expulsar a la federació local de sindicats de Sabadell, els quals continuaven protestant contra la tutela de la FAI negant-se a pagar les seves cotitzacions confederals. L'organització de Sabadell estava sotmesa a la influència trentista. I els trentistes tractaren d'usar la federació local de Sabadell com plataforma amb la qual canviar el comitè regional existent i recuperar la direcció de la . Però el comitè regional va intentar crear una organització rival en Sabadell. L'enfrontament s'estengué per València,...

En gener de 1933, després d'una sublevació anarquista frustrada, 44 sindicats catalans contraatacaren la FAI amb una llista d'exigències (peticions trentistes poc realistes). El trentisme necessitava una organització pròpia amb la qual enfrontar-se a la FAI. Per això van crear una Federació Sindicalista Llibertària.

En març de 1933, en el ple regional català en el Teatre Meridiana de Barcelona, es donà un ultimàtum als sindicats de Sabadell per lliurar-se als seus oponents.

El 15 d'abril de 1933, el comitè regional català va rebre una nota d'Emiliano Mira dient que refutaven les decisions del ple de març. El secretari regional va escriure una nota on notificava que els sindicats de Sabadell quedaven expulsats de la (nota que volia publicar a Solidaridad Obrera, però aquest fou suspès per ordre governativa).

Amb Sabadell abandonaren la 50 Sindicats de Catalunya i diversos de Llevant, on els sindicats més poderosos eren trentistes. Així naixeren els Sindicats d'Oposició. http://www.geocities.com/edgalindo/faqs.htm

Genovese protester, 23 year old Carlo Giuliani, armed with a fire extinguisher & rage against repression & injustice, was killed, shot twice in the streets by the Carabinieri. Then, in a fit of excessive cruelty, the kind of excess that capitalism is best known by, the Carabinieri ran over his dead body with a heavy police vehicle.

Hundreds of thousands protested at the various anti-capitalist actions throughout the Spring of 2001 & the Summer of Resistance that followed. Police brutality & repression by the "democratic" ruling elite became increasingly heavy-handed, with lethal results. On this ugly, antidemocratic, repressive day, UK PM Tony Blair could say only that ``We would prefer to be out there in a normal setting being able to meet people, Blair told reporters. ``But we can't because some of these demonstrators are so violent.''


-- http://thomas.palaceunlimited.com/sa/infolinks.html


-- http://www.anarchism.org.nz/i-r/index.htm


-- PLACEHOLDER DAILYDOO Among the groups under surveillance was the collective that operated Left Bank Books in Seattle's Pike Place Market. Jo Maynes, Lynn Thorndycraft, & Paul Zilsel coordinated the United Front For Political Defense. They assisted lawyer Michael Withey as he represented NLF timebomb maker James Wesley Akers. http://www.livelogcity.com/users/copkiller11/434.html?replyto=8370 http://www.livelogcity.com/users/copkiller/923.html?view=14747
http://www.livelogcity.com/users/copkiller11/434.html

2 -- "One must start with the impossible in order to reach the possible." -Hermann Hesse

http://www.peaceabbey.org/plaques.htm http://home.tampabay.rr.com/bluemax/hermann.htm
http://www.mcl.ucsb.edu/hesse/about-e.html

4 -- TO DO DAILY DOO: Leonard baskin still needs to be finished up & posted. See Gallery page in progress Also: Blake needs images


9 -- "When guns are criminalized, criminals won't have anyone to steal guns from."


25 --

~Albert Camus, "Create Dangerously", 1957


30 --

1926, MONTH DAY UNJKWON Thich Nhat Hanh lives. ordained a Zen Buddhist monk in 1942 at the age of 16.

Zen master, scholar, poet & peace advocate, his life-long efforts to generate peace & reconcilliation moved Martin Luther King, Jr. to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1967, saying, "I do not personally know of anyone more worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize than this gentle Buddhist monk from Vietnam. He is a holy man, for he is humble & devout. He is a scholar of immense intellectual capacity. His ideas for peace, if applied, would build a monument to ecumenism, to world brotherhood, to humanity."

Authored more than 75 books on engaged Buddhism in Vietnamese, French & English